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PROPORTIONALITY IN THE NEW GERMAN 
INSURANCE CONTRACT ACT 2008
Helmut Heiss*
Abstract
In 2008, the German legislature enacted a completely revised Insurance Contract Act, in which a 
new rule of proportionality replaced the former all-or-nothing principle for questions of liability. 
This article outlines the reasons of this shift and the impact of the rule of proportionality on 
insurers and policyholders. It also addresses the criticisms raised regarding the new system as 
well as some of the technical problems arising in its application, for example with regard to 
placement of the burden of proof. This is followed by a short discussion of the rule as it is 
traditionally applied in Switzerland and as it is adopted in the Principles of European Insurance 
Contract Law (PEICL). 
Keywords: all-or-nothing-principle; discharge of the insurer; insurance; PEICL; proportionality 
rule; proportionate reduction; Swiss Insurance Contract Act 
1 The New German Insurance Contract Act 2008
The new German Insurance Contract Act (ICA) entered into force on 1 January 2008. 
Its major aim is to provide policyholders with a level of protection which is in line with 
modern concepts of consumer law.1 This aim was considered to be so fundamental that 
a limited reform of the old Insurance Contract Act 1908 would not suffice; instead an 
entirely new codification had to take place.2 
 The codification process was launched on 7 June 2000, when the Federal Ministry 
of Justice entrusted an expert committee with the drafting of a new Insurance Contract 
Act.3 On 19 April 2004, the expert committee submitted its proposal to the Ministry.4 
The draft submitted by the expert committee was followed by a draft proposed by the 
Federal Ministry of Justice on 13 March 20065 and the official governmental bill on 20 
December 2006.6 The bill largely followed the original proposals made by the expert 
committee, and was enacted with some additional changes7 on 23 November 2007.8
* Dr. iur. (University of Innsbruck), LL.M. (University of Chicago); Professor of Law (University of 
Zurich); Chairman of the Project Group on a Restatement of European Insurance Contract Law; of counsel, 
gbf attorneys-at-law, Zurich. 
1 Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Reform des Versicherungsvertragsrechts 
vom 20. Dezember 2006, Drucksache 16/3945, at 1 (section A).
2 Kommission zur Reform des Versicherungsvertragsrechts, ‘Abschlussbericht der Kommission 
zur Reform des Versicherungsvertragsrechts vom 19. April 2004’, 25 Schriftenreihe der Zeitschrift 
Versicherungsrecht (2004), at 1.1.2; Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur 
Reform des Versicherungsvertragsrechts vom 20. Dezember 2006, Drucksache 16/3945, at 47, Begründung 
(section A.I.).
3 Bundesministerium der Justiz, Pressemitteilung Nr. 40/00 vom 7. Juni 2000.
4 Kommission zur Reform des Versicherungsvertragsrechts (2004), above n. 2.
5 Referentenentwurf des Bundesministeriums der Justiz zur Reform des Versicherungsvertragsrechts 
(VVG) vom 13. März 2006.
6 Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Reform des Versicherungsvertragsrechts 
vom 20. Dezember 2006, Drucksache 16/3945.
7 The final changes were proposed on 28 June 2007 by the Judicial Committee of the German Bundestag; 
see Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des Rechtsausschusses (6. Ausschuss) zu dem Gesetzentwurf der 
Bundesregierung, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Reform des Versicherungsvertragsrechts vom 28.06.2007, 
Drucksache 16/5862.
8 Gesetz zur Reform des Versicherungsvertragsrechts vom 23. November 2007, BGBl. Teil I/2007, 
Nr. 59 vom 29.11.2007, 2634-2678.
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 The statutory materials list 10 major issues at the heart of the law reform,9 among 
them the abolition of the so-called all-or-nothing principle and its replacement by a 
rule of proportionality. The old all-or-nothing principle discharged insurers of their 
liability altogether in specific situations. The statutory materials mention, for instance, 
the discharge of liability in cases of causation of loss (ex § 61 ICA 1908) and in cases 
of breach of duties (Obliegenheiten), including breach of the duty of disclosure (ex 
§ 21 ICA 1908), of duties relating to an aggravation of risk (ex § 25 ICA 1908), of 
contractually imposed Obliegenheiten (ex § 6 ICA 1908), etc.
2  Proportionality in the New German ICA 2008
2.1 Discharge of Liability Depends on the Policyholder’s Degree of Fault
2.1.1 The new system
The new German ICA 2008 introduces an entirely new principle through which the 
ability of an insurer to discharge his liability is limited. This is achieved by reducing the 
insurance money in proportion to the degree of fault apportioned to the policyholder. 
However, the right of an insurer to reduce the insurance money payable is limited to 
cases in which the policyholder has acted with gross negligence.10 In cases of ordinary 
negligence, the entire amount of the insurance money will be payable.11 In contrast, the 
insurer will be fully discharged in cases of intentional or fraudulent behaviour by the 
policyholder.12
 The statutory materials make clear that this proportionate reduction of the insurance 
money is, firstly, considered to be fairer than the old all-or-nothing principle. If 
the insurance money is paid out in its entirety to a policyholder acting with a high 
degree of ordinary negligence, it seems appropriate to pay out at least a share of the 
insurance money to a policyholder acting with a low degree of gross negligence. 
After all, the two situations are factually very similar, and should, thus, not be treated 
significantly differently.13 This would, secondly, make the application of the rule easier. 
Determinations of fault always require a judgment, and there is, therefore, as a matter 
of fact, always an element of subjectivity involved. Hence, a judge should not be forced 
to draw a sharp line between cases of negligence, in which the policyholder will be 
paid the insurance money without any reduction (all), and cases of gross negligence, in 
which the policyholder will not receive anything (nothing). Instead, judges should be 
provided with a flexible system, allowing them to impart justice in accordance with the 
circumstances of a particular case.14
2.1.2 Criticism of the new system
The introduction of a system of proportionate reduction of the insurance money payable 
has led to criticism being raised in German literature. Most of the criticism is based on 
one or more of three arguments: (1) the new system reduces the deterrent effect of the 
9 Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Reform des Versicherungsvertragsrechts 
vom 20. Dezember 2006, Drucksache 16/3945, at 47-55, Begründung (section A.II.).
10 § 26(1) 2, § 28(2) 2, § 81(2), § 82(3) 2 and § 86(2) 3 ICA 2008.
11 This follows e contrario from the fact that the provisions as listed above n. 10 restrict the right of the 
insurer to reduce the insurance money to cases of gross negligence.
12 § 26(1) 1, § 28(2) 1, § 81(1), § 82(3) 1 and § 86(2) 2 ICA 2008.
13 Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Reform des Versicherungsvertragsrechts 
vom 20. Dezember 2006, Drucksache 16/3945, at 49, Begründung (section A.II.4.); Kommission zur 
Reform des Versicherungsvertragsrechts (2004) above n. 2, at 1.2.2.10.
14 Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Reform des Versicherungsvertragsrechts 
vom 20. Dezember 2006, Drucksache 16/3945, at 49, Begründung (section A.II.4.).
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sanctions;15 (2) the new system privileges careless policyholders to the detriment of 
careful policyholders;16 (3) the new system is too flexible, and consequently creates 
legal uncertainty, which could lead to an excessively high number of court cases.17
 The first argument is evidently correct, but appears to oversimplify the matter. First 
of all, the strict all-or-nothing principle may simply have had an overly deterrent effect. 
In other words, while a reduction of the insurance money is certainly a more lenient 
sanction, it may nevertheless be sufficient to deter policyholders from acting with gross 
negligence.18 To take a relatively straightforward example: will a couple who has bought 
a house using a mortgage more readily attempt to obtain full indemnification by causing 
fire with gross negligence if they know that they will not lose all, but only part of the 
insurance money? Obviously, under normal circumstances, nobody wishes to lose a 
family home, irrespective of how much insurance money will be received. Clearly, a 
reduction of the insurance money may pose an existential risk to the couple, similar 
to the risk of a total loss of cover. Thus, it seems that the deterrent effect arising from 
a proportionate reduction in the amount of insurance money to be paid out would be 
sufficient in such situations. Moreover, the new system may even increase the deterrent 
effect. Many authors have argued that, under the old all-or-nothing-principle, judges 
would often have classified gross negligence as ordinary negligence in order to prevent 
the policyholder from losing cover altogether.19 The incentive to protect policyholders 
in this way was removed following the introduction of a rule for a proportionate 
reduction of the insurance money. As a result, the deterrent effect has been increased 
by the introduction of the rule of proportionality.20 Overall, it would appear that the 
deterrent effect of the new system should, if nothing else, be sufficient.
 The second argument is based on the hypothesis that there might be careful 
policyholders who would never act with gross negligence. Such policyholders would 
not need to take out insurance covering, at least in part, grossly negligent behaviour. 
The new German law would, however, force them to insure such behaviour, because it 
is mandatory in this respect. As a consequence, careful policyholders would subsidise 
careless policyholders with at least a part of the premium paid.21 However, this argument 
is not well-founded for several reasons. First of all, no one can exclude the possibility of 
committing a grossly negligent act. Even the old German ICA 1908 contained several 
provisions demonstrating this point: 
 - Ex § 152 ICA 1908 provided policyholders with cover for insured events 
caused by gross negligence in third party liability insurance. Although 
this provision was not mandatory, and parties could have excluded gross 
negligence from the cover, the author is unaware of such liability insurance 
products having been offered or demanded on the German market. If, 
however, there had been a significant number of policyholders wishing to 
exclude the possibility of any gross negligence on their part, it would have 
been a good selling proposition to provide them with cheap liability cover 
for ordinary negligence only. 
15 For instance C. Armbrüster, ‘Abstufungen der Leistungsfreiheit bei grob fahrlässigem Verhalten des 
VN’, Versicherungsrecht, at 676 (2003).
16 For instance J. Prölss, ‘Das versicherungsrechtliche Alles-oder-Nichts-Prinzip in der 
Reformdiskussion – Allgemeine Überlegungen zum Zwischenbericht der Kommission zur Reform des 
Versicherungsvertragsrechts vom 30.5.2002’, Versicherungsrecht, at 671 (2003).
17 The legislature does not deny that there may be an increase in legal uncertainty, at least for a period 
of time after the introduction of the principle of proportionality; see Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, 
Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Reform des Versicherungsvertragsrechts vom 20. Dezember 2006, Drucksache 
16/3945.
18 In detail H. Heiss, ‘Kommentar zu § 28 VVG’, in H. Baumann, R.M. Beckmann, K. Johannsen and 
R. Johannsen (eds.), Bruck/Möller, Versicherungsvertragsgesetz, Grosskommentar, vol. 1, Einführung, §§ 
1-32 (2008), at § 28, para. 187.
19 Zwischenbericht der Kommission zur Reform des Versicherungsvertragsrechts vom 30. Mai 2002, 
section B.6.
20 Heiss (2008), above n. 18, at § 28, para. 187.
21 Prölss (2003), above n. 16, at 671.
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 - Ex § 67(2) ICA 1908 prevents an insurer from exercising his subrogation 
rights against the insured’s family members, even in cases of grossly 
negligent behaviour.
 - Last but not least, it is a traditional principle of personal insurance law 
that causation of the insured event by grossly negligent behaviour will 
not discharge the insurer of his liability (ex §§ 169, 170 ICA 1908 (life 
assurance); ex § 178l ICA 1908 (health insurance); ex § 181 ICA 1908 
(accident insurance)).
Moreover, the new ICA 2008 provides insurers with remedies, or at least allows insurers 
to contract for remedies, which will ensure that the social costs of gross negligence 
will be borne by those policyholders who act carelessly. For instance, the amount of 
premium charged may be calculated on the basis of the number and size of insured events 
occurring to a particular policyholder. In this way, careless policyholders causing more 
insured events will pay an increased premium.22 The same happens if insurers decide 
to terminate the contract following one or several acts committed by the policyholder 
with gross negligence.23 The policyholder will be forced to apply for cover with another 
insurer, and will have to disclose any cases of gross negligence which have occurred 
in the past. Consequently, the new insurer will either refuse the application or charge a 
higher premium. Thus, policyholders are ultimately charged with the costs of their own 
careless behaviour.24
 The third argument is clearly correct. The more flexible a legal rule is, the less 
predictable are the outcomes of individual cases. However, it must be pointed out that 
flexibility was the main objective of the new rule. Therefore, the legislature consciously 
decided to pay the price of legal uncertainty in return for equitable solutions. At any rate, 
leading judges have predicted that a significant body of case law will emerge and provide 
guidelines, thereby making the reduction of the insurance money more predictable.25 
Thus, a degree of legal uncertainty, at least for the period of time immediately following 
the entering into force of the new ICA 2008, is simply the price to be paid for introducing 
a new equitable regime.
2.2 Proportionate Reduction as a Sub-system of an Entirely New System of 
Sanctions
While the fault-based proportionate reduction of insurance money payable has been 
the source of most of the discussions accompanying the reform of German insurance 
contract law, it is only a subsystem or a brick in the wall of a new system of sanctions. 
This is clear from the mere fact that it only applies in cases of gross negligence, raising 
the question of what applies in cases of negligence, intention or fraud. In order to fully 
appreciate the principle of reduction, it must be put into context.
 The new German insurance contract law follows, albeit with exceptions, a new and 
unique system of sanctions. In general, fraudulent behaviour by a policyholder will 
fully discharge an insurer of his liability, even if an insured event is in no way causally 
connected to the fraud.26 In contrast, intentional behaviour on the part of a policyholder 
will discharge the insurer only if, and to the extent, that the behaviour has caused the 
22 Heiss (2008), above n. 18, at § 28, para. 188.
23 For instance, the right to cancel the contract is granted to the insurer in § 28(1) ICA 2008.
24 Heiss (2008), above n. 18, at § 28, para. 188.
25 Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Reform des Versicherungsvertragsrechts 
vom 20. Dezember 2006, Drucksache 16/3945, at 69, Begründung (section B. Zu § 28, Zu Absatz 2).
26 See, e.g., § 28(3) 2 ICA 2008; cf. also Heiss (2008), above n. 18, at § 28, paras. 151 ff.; in respect 
of the concept of fraud for the purposes of § 28, cf. Heiss (2008), above n. 18, at § 28, paras. 156 ff.; 
H.P. Schwintowski, ‘Kommentar zu § 28 VVG’, in H.P. Schwintowski and C. Brömmelmeyer (eds.), 
Praxiskommentar zum Versicherungsvertragsrecht (2008), at § 28, paras. 94 ff.; J. Felsch, ‘Kommentar 
zu § 28 VVG’, in W. Rüffer, D. Halbach and P. Schimikowski (eds.), Versicherungsvertragsgesetz, 
Handkommentar (2009), at § 28, paras. 58 and 76 ff.; M. Wandt, ‘Kommentar zu § 28 VVG’, in T. Langheid 
and M. Wandt (eds.), Münchener Kommentar zum Versicherungsvertragsgesetz, vol. 1, Systematische 
Darstellungen, Erläuterungen zum EGVVG, §§ 1-99 VVG (2010), at § 28, paras. 301 ff.
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insured event or increased the insurance money payable.27 Hence, the old all-or-nothing 
principle is replaced by a system whereby a discharge from liability depends on the 
degree of causation. Thus, a policyholder who breaches a contractual duty intentionally 
may still have a claim to all, or at least part, of the insurance money, depending on the 
degree of causation. The same applies in cases of gross negligence. Therefore, discharge 
of an insurer’s liability will primarily be limited to the part of the loss caused by grossly 
negligent conduct.28 Within this part, a reduction will be made in proportion to the 
degree of gross negligence.29 The old all-or-nothing principle has consequently been 
replaced by the cumulative application of two criteria: the degree of causation and the 
degree of gross negligence. Finally, an insurer will not be discharged from his liability 
at all where the policyholder acts with negligence.30
2.3 Exemptions from the Rule of Proportionality
The new system is not without its exceptions. Most importantly, § 21(2) ICA 2008 
adheres to the old all-or-nothing principle in cases of non-disclosure or misrepresentation 
committed with gross negligence. There will be no reduction in the amount of the 
insurance money payable depending on the degree of gross negligence. At the same 
time, the discharge of an insurer’s liability is not limited to the part of the loss caused 
by the information which was not disclosed or was misrepresented. Any degree of 
causation will fully discharge an insurer. If, for instance, the information not disclosed 
by a policyholder has not caused the loss, but only increased it by 1%, an insurer will 
nevertheless be fully discharged from his liability.31
 The harshness of the sanctions applied in cases of a breach of the disclosure duty 
is, however, alleviated in another way. Where an insurer would have concluded the 
contract had he known the information which was not disclosed or was misrepresented, 
albeit in consideration of a higher premium or on other terms, he may only ask for a 
higher premium or the application of such terms.32 In case of gross negligent breach of 
the disclosure duty, the higher premium or other terms will apply retroactively.33
2.4 Technical Problems of the Rule of Proportionality
The new principle of proportionate reduction has raised several technical questions 
regarding its application. It would go far beyond the purposes of this article to deal with 
these questions in detail. Nevertheless, the problems raised shall be presented, and the 
solutions favoured so far in court decisions and legal commentary shall be set out.
2.4.1 Burden of proof
The first problem addresses the burden of proof concerning the fault of the policyholder. 
In cases of a breach of contractual duty, it is a general principle of German law that the 
27 Case law also applies the concept of intent as defined in § 276(1) of the German Civil Code to insurance 
law. See Felsch (2009), above n. 26, at § 28, paras. 61 ff.; see case law, for example, OLG Köln 15.2.2005 
Versicherungsrecht 2005, at 1231; OLG Saarbrücken 12.7.2006 Versicherungsrecht 2007, at 533; BGH 
21.4.1993 Versicherungsrecht 1993, at 832; BGH 2.6.1993 Versicherungsrecht 1993, at 960.
28 See, e.g., § 28(3) ICA 2008.
29 See, e.g., § 28(2) ICA 2008.
30 See Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Reform des 
Versicherungsvertragsrechts vom 20. Dezember 2006, Drucksache 16/3945, at 69, Begründung (section B. 
Zu § 26, Zu Absatz 1); see also H. Heiss, ‘Das Quotensystem im neuen VVG’, in C. Brömmelmeyer et al. 
(eds.), Versicherungswissenschaftliche Studien no. 42 (2012) 191, at 193 et seq.
31 See, for instance, C. Rolfs, ‘Kommentar zu § 21 VVG’, in H. Baumann, R.M. Beckmann, K. Johannsen 
and R. Johannsen (eds.), Bruck/Möller, Versicherungsvertragsgesetz, Grosskommentar, vol. 1, Einführung, 
§§ 1-32 (2008), at § 21, para. 40; see also Heiss (2012), above n. 30, at 193.
32 The first sentence of § 19(4) ICA 2008.
33 The second sentence of § 19(4) ICA 2008.
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debtor must prove that he acted without fault.34 The ICA 2008 follows the same principle 
and presumes the policyholder to have acted with gross negligence when breaching 
a contractual duty (except for cases of causation of loss, which are not considered a 
breach of duty). However, the amount by which the insurance money will be reduced 
depends not only on the existence (or rather, the presumption) of gross negligence as 
such, but on its degree. Therefore, there is a debate as to whether the burden of proof for 
a particular degree of gross negligence lies with the insurer or with the policyholder.35 
Overall, it seems that most commentators accept the view that a particular degree of 
gross negligence must be proven by the insurer.36
 Within this debate, some commentators have proposed that the presumed gross 
negligence of a policyholder will entitle an insurer to reduce the insurance money by 
50%.37 If an insurer wants to increase the reduction, he must prove a degree of gross 
negligence beyond 50%. In turn, if a policyholder wants to avoid a 50% reduction, he 
must prove a degree of negligence below 50%. The vast majority of all commentators 
reject this proposal, because it would seriously infringe upon the flexibility of the rule, 
the attainment of which was, after all, the major aim of the legislature.38
2.4.2 Reduction by 0% or 100% possible?
Another debate concerns the question of whether, in appropriate cases, the reduction 
could amount either to 0% or even to 100%. The majority of authors believe that this is 
possible,39 and the German Supreme Court has recently confirmed this view.40
34 See the second sentence of § 280(1) of the German Civil Code (BGB).
35 As to the debate with further references, Heiss (2008), above n. 18, at § 28, paras. 217 f.
36 Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Reform des Versicherungsvertragsrechts 
vom 20. Dezember 2006, Drucksache 16/3945, at 69, Begründung (section B. Zu § 28, Zu Absatz 2); 
C. Moosbauer, Das quotale Leistungskürzungsrecht des Versicherers bei der grob fahrlässigen Verletzung 
einer vertraglichen Obliegenheit nach § 28 II S 2 VVG (2011), at 86; J. Prölss, ‘Kommentar zu § 28 VVG’, 
in E. Prölss and A. Martin (eds.), Prölss/Martin, Versicherungsvertragsgesetz, Kommentar zu VVG, EGVVG 
mit Rom I-VO, VVG-InfoV und Vermittlerrecht sowie Kommentierung wichtiger Versicherungsbedingungen 
(2010), at § 28, para. 138; M. Nugel, ‘Quotenbildung bei einer Leistungskürzung nach dem VVG’, 
Monatsschrift für Deutsches Recht, at 1321 (2008); R. Rixecker, ‘VVG 2008 – Eine Einführung; II. 
Obliegenheiten vor dem Versicherungsfall’, Zeitschrift für Schadensrecht, at 73 (2007).
37 J. Felsch, ‘Neuregelung von Obliegenheiten und Gefahrerhöhung’, Recht und Schaden, at 493 (2007); 
M. Nugel, ‘Das neue VVG – Quotenbildung bei der Leistungskürzung wegen grober Fahrlässigkeit’, 
61 Monatsschrift für Deutsches Recht, at 26 (2007); J. Grote and C. Schneider, ‘VVG 2008: Das neue 
Versicherungsvertragsrecht, Auswirkungen für gewerbliche Versicherungen’, Betriebs-Berater, at 2695 
(2007); U. Weidner and H. Schuster, ‘Quotelung von Entschädigungsleistungen bei grober Fahrlässigkeit 
des VN in der Sachversicherung nach neuem VVG’, Recht und Schaden, at 364 (2007); H. Baumann, 
‘Quotenregelung contra Alles-oder-Nichts-Prinzip im Versicherungsfall – Überlegungen zur Reform des 
§ 61 VVG’, Recht und Schaden, at 9 (2005) de lege ferenda to § 81 (at least 50 % reduction); T. Langheid, 
‘Die Reform des Versicherungsvertragsgesetzes’, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, at 3669 (2007); critical 
on this point, Nugel (2008), above n. 36, at 1321; R. Rixecker, ‘Quotelung bei Obliegenheitsverletzung: 
Alles, Nichts oder die Hälfte’, 98 Zeitschrift für die gesamte Versicherungswissenschaft, 1, at 6 (2009); 
D. Looschelders, ‘Quotelung bei Obliegenheitsverletzungen: Alles, Nichts oder die Hälfte’, 98 Zeitschrift 
für die gesamte Versicherungswissenschaft, 1, at 28 (2009); of the same opinion, Felsch (2009), above 
n. 26, at § 28, para. 165; cf. LG Münster 20.8.2009 Versicherungsrecht 2009, at 1615.
38 Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Reform des Versicherungsvertragsrechts 
vom 20. Dezember 2006, Drucksache 16/3945, at 69, Begründung (B. Zu § 28, Zu Absatz 2); Heiss (2008), 
above n. 18, at § 28, para. 190; Moosbauer (2011), above n. 36, at 76 with further references; in detail Heiss 
(2012), above n. 30, 199 et seq.
39 Heiss (2008), above n. 18, at § 28, para. 195; also LG Dortmund 15.7.2010 Versicherungsrecht 2010, at 
1596; compare Wandt (2010), above n. 26, at § 28, para. 240; D. Looschelders, ‘Schuldhafte Herbeiführung 
des Versicherungsfalls nach der VVG-Reform’, Versicherungsrecht, at 6 (2008); Felsch (2007), above n. 37, 
at 492; Looschelders (2009), above n. 37, at 25 f.; Schwintowski (2008), above n. 26, at § 28, para. 58; 
Rixecker (2009), above n. 37, at 7; W. Römer, ‘Zu ausgewählten Problemen der VVG-Reform nach dem 
Referentenentwurf vom 13. März 2006 (Teil I)’, Versicherungsrecht, at 741 (2006); Weidner and Schuster 
(2007), above n. 37, at 364; Grote and Schneider (2007), above n. 37, at 2695; of a contrary opinion Prölss 
(2010), above n. 36, at § 28, para. 136; Nugel (2007), above n. 37, at 27; Schwintowski (2008), above n. 26, 
at § 28, para. 78.
40 BGH 22.06.2011, IV ZR 225/10, Beck-Rechtsprechung 2011, at 19286.
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2.4.3 Multiple reduction
Yet another question arises where the policyholder has breached more than one duty or 
where the breach of a duty is accompanied by a causation of the loss. Among the various 
acts committed with gross negligence, should the one committed with the highest 
degree of gross negligence be decisive for the overall degree of reducing the insurance 
money?41 Or should the two reductions be added up?42 Or should the insurance money, 
reduced once because of the first act, be further reduced because of the second act?43 
Or should both acts be taken together, in order to determine an overall reduction in the 
amount of the insurance money?44 It seems that, so far, a majority of commentators take 
the final view.
2.4.4 Contractual determination of amount of reduction
Some commentators have questioned whether parties could set fixed amounts of 
reduction in their contract.45 The answer depends on the degree to which the relevant 
provisions of the ICA 2008 are mandatory.
 § 81 ICA 2008 (causation of loss) is not mandatory.46 Therefore, parties are free to 
derogate from § 81 ICA 2008 by contract. However, if another regime is established 
by general terms of insurance, such terms might be held to be unfair, and thus void, 
if they completely eliminate the flexibility of the sanctions.47 All the other relevant 
provisions are mandatory in favour of the policyholder. Consequently, the contract may 
derogate from these provisions insofar as such derogation is not to the detriment of the 
policyholder. It is, therefore, the view of this author that the contract may provide for 
maximum sums by which the insurance money may be reduced, but not, for instance, 
for a fixed reduction of 50%.48
3 Proportionality: A Short Comparative Note
3.1 Origins: ICA 2008 Transplants Art. 14(2) of the Swiss ICA 1908 into 
German Law
The concept of reducing insurance money depending on the degree of gross negligence 
on the part of the policyholder is not an invention created by the German legislature, but 
rather a legal transplant originating from Swiss insurance contract law. In spite of the 
fact that the Swiss Insurance Contract Act 1908 not only had the same date of enactment 
41 Nugel (2007), above n. 37, at 31; Felsch (2007), above n. 37, at 497; critical C.D. Günther and 
S. Spielmann, ‘Vollständige und teilweise Leistungsfreiheit nach dem VVG 2008 am Beispiel der 
Sachversicherung (Teil 2)’, Recht und Schaden, at 185 (2008); dissenting Grote and Schneider (2007), 
above n. 37, at 2695 f.; Prölss (2010), above n. 36, at § 28, para. 132; Felsch (2009), above n. 26, at § 28, 
paras. 189 ff.
42 Felsch (2007), above n. 37, at 496 f.; Günther and Spielmann (2008), above n. 41, at 185; Nugel (2007), 
above n. 37, at 31; Heiss (2008), above n. 18, at § 28, para. 199; Prölss (2010), above n. 36, at § 28, para. 
133; Felsch (2009), above n. 26, at § 28, para. 187.
43 Günther and Spielmann (2008), above n. 41, at 186; Nugel (2007), above n. 37, at 31; Nugel (2008), 
above n. 36, at 1325; cautiously approving Prölss (2010), above n. 36, at § 28, para. 134.
44 Felsch (2007), above n. 37, at 497; R. Hess and M. Burmann, ‘Die Quote bei grob fahrlässiger 
Obliegenheitsverletzung’, Neue Zeitschrift für Verkehrsrecht, at 10 (2009); Wandt (2010), above n. 26, at 
§ 28, paras. 248 f.; P. Pohlmann, ‘Kommentar zu § 28 VVG’, in D. Looschelders and P. Pohlmann (eds.), 
VVG-Kommentar (2010), at § 28, para. 123; Rixecker (2009), above n. 37, at 9; Looschelders (2009), n. 37, 
at 30; dissenting Günther and Spielmann (2008), above n. 41, at 185; Prölss (2010), above n. 36, at § 28, 
para. 132.
45 Heiss (2008), above n. 18, at § 28, para. 198; Heiss (2012), above n. 30, at 205; Wandt (2010), above 
n. 26, at § 28, para. 256.
46 See § 87 ICA 2008.
47 See § 307(1) together with (2)(1) of the German Civil Code.
48 Heiss (2008), above n. 18, at § 28, para. 203.
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as the old German ICA 1908, but also included the all-or-nothing principle,49 Art. 
14(2) of the Swiss ICA 1908 deviated from this principle and established a principle of 
proportionate reduction in cases of loss caused by grossly negligent conduct. However, 
proportionality does not apply in cases of breach of (contractual) duties, such as the pre-
contractual duty of disclosure (Arts. 4 and 5 of the Swiss ICA 1908), the duty to avoid 
and/or disclose aggravations of risk (Arts. 28 and 30 of the Swiss ICA 1908), the duty 
to take precautionary measures (Art. 29 of the Swiss ICA 1908), the duty to notify the 
loss (Art. 38 of the Swiss ICA 1908), etc.
 Art. 14(2) of the Swiss ICA 1908 was used as a model for the new German ICA 
2008. The German legislature did not, however, restrict the principle of proportionate 
reduction to cases of causation of loss, but extended its scope of application to cases of 
breach of (contractual) duty, despite the two being different in nature. Most importantly, 
causation of loss is not considered to be a breach of a duty, but the subject of a statutory 
exemption clause (§ 81 of the German ICA 2008), discharging the insurer of his liability. 
Nevertheless, the legislature thought that policyholder protection justified an application 
of the principle of proportionality, even in cases of breach of duty.
 It would appear that the approach taken by the German legislature will be followed 
by the Swiss legislature. The most recent governmental bill for an entirely new Swiss 
Insurance Contract Act (Swiss Draft ICA) proposed on 7 September 201150 follows 
the German model, and also extends the principle of proportionality to cases of breach 
of (contractual) duty.51 The Swiss legislature even attempts to improve upon the new 
German ICA 2008, as it proposes to incorporate cases of grossly negligent breach of the 
pre-contractual duty of disclosure into the system of proportionality.52
 It might be assumed that the new German ICA 2008 and the future Swiss ICA 
will in fact be very similar, at least as far as the proportionate reduction of insurance 
money is concerned. Indeed, this might be true if one looks at the black letter law only. 
However, there are important differences in the living insurance laws of Germany and 
Switzerland. Some are due to differences in the black letter law, which appear to be of 
minor importance at first sight, but turn out to have a strong practical impact. Others are 
due to a different culture in dealing with proportionality.
 An apparently minor difference in black letter law concerns the burden of proof for 
causation, which will have a tremendous effect on the living laws of both countries.53 
Under the German ICA 2008, the burden of proving lack of causation lies with a 
policyholder in cases of breach of (contractual) duty. The burden of proof lies with an 
insurer only in cases of causation of loss. In contrast, the burden of proving a causal 
link between the behaviour of a policyholder and the insured event or the degree of loss 
lies with an insurer in all cases under the Swiss Draft ICA. Given the fact that a causal 
link, or an absence thereof, is very hard to prove in cases of breach of contractual duty, 
the different attributions of the burden of proof is expected to produce widely differing 
results in Germany and Switzerland.
 The cultural aspect concerns the attitude of courts towards reducing insurance 
money. Recent studies have clearly shown that German courts readily reduce insurance 
money by 50% or more and, in cases of driving while intoxicated, even by 100% if a 
blood alcohol content of 0.1% or more is reached.54 In contrast, reductions in the amount 
of the insurance money by Swiss courts come to no more than 10%-50% in the vast 
49 For instance, Arts. 6 and 8 of the Swiss ICA 1908.
50 Bundesgesetz über den Versicherungsvertrag (Versicherungsvertragsgesetz, VVG) (Entwurf), SR 
221.229.1 (available online at <http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/ff/2011/7819.pdf>).
51 See Arts. 19(1) and 41(6) of the Swiss Draft ICA.
52 See Art. 19(1) of the Swiss Draft ICA.
53 See in detail U. Mönnich, ‘Vom “Alles-oder-Nichts-Prinzip” zur Quotelung der Versicherungsleistung 
– Rechtsvergleichende Überlegungen zur Reform des Versicherungsvertragsrechts in der Schweiz und in 
Deutschland’, in A.K. Schnyder (ed.), Totalrevision des VVG (2012 in print).
54 See in detail id.
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majority of all cases.55 Moreover, academic studies indicate that insurers usually reduce 
the insurance money even less than the courts.56 Proportionate reduction is, therefore, a 
very different concept in German and Swiss practice.
3.2 Possible Future: Proportionality in European Insurance Contract Law?
3.2.1 Preliminary remark: Plans for a future European Insurance 
Contract Law
Strong efforts are currently being made towards the creation of a European insurance 
contract law. Academics published the first volume of Principles of European Insurance 
Contract Law (PEICL) in 2009,57 which will be followed by a second, final volume in 
2013 or early 2014. The PEICL have been drafted as an optional instrument of European 
insurance contract law, allowing parties to opt out of national (insurance) law by opting 
for the application of the PEICL. Due to the mainly mandatory character of the rules on 
international insurance contract law (Art. 7 Rome I)58 and national insurance contract 
law,59 this option does not exist at present; it requires an EU regulation on the matter.
 EU institutions have repeatedly expressed their wish or intent to use the PEICL as a 
draft for a regulation to establish an optional instrument of European insurance contract 
law. The following documents deserve special mention:
 - Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘The 
European Insurance Contract’;60
 - Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘The 28th 
regime – an alternative allowing less law making at Community level’;61
 - Green Paper from the Commission of 1 July 2010 on policy options for 
progress towards a European Contract Law for consumers and businesses;62
 - European Parliament Resolution of 8 June 2011 on policy options for 
progress towards a European Contract Law for consumers and businesses;63
 - Press Release ‘EU Justice Commissioner Viviane Reding meets with 
leaders of Europe’s insurance industry’ (21 September 2011).64
3.2.2  Proportionality in the PEICL
The PEICL deal with causation of loss (Article 9:101 PEICL), precautionary measures 
(Articles 4:101 f. PEICL), pre-contractual duty of disclosure (Articles 2:101 f. PEICL), 
aggravation of risk (Articles 4:201 f. PEICL), as well as notification of the insured event 
(Article 6:101 PEICL) and claims cooperation (Article 6:102 PEICL). Each of these 
provisions also governs a potential discharge of an insurer’s liability or a reduction in 
the amount of the insurance money. The approach taken varies:
 If the loss is caused by the policyholder or the insured, an insurer shall be discharged 
of his obligation to pay insurance money only if the policyholder or the insured has 
55 See, for instance, M.C. Feifel, Die Quotelung bei Obliegenheitsverletzungen nach § 28 VVG 2008 
(2011), at 135 ff.
56 With further references to German and Swiss court cases and literature, Mönnich, above n. 53. 
57 J. Basedow, J. Birds, M.A. Clarke, H. Cousy and H. Heiss (eds.), Principles of European Insurance 
Contract Law (PEICL) (2009).
58 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the 
law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) [2008] OJ L177/6.
59 See H. Heiss, ‘Introduction’, in Basedow et al., above n. 57, at 15 f.
60 [2005] OJ C157/1.
61 [2011] OJ C21/26.
62 COM (2010) 348 final.
63 2011/2013(INI).
64 MEMO/11/624.
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acted ‘with intent to cause the loss or recklessly and with knowledge that the loss would 
probably result’.65 Negligent causation will not discharge the insurer at all. However, 
an insurer is allowed to introduce a clause into the policy ‘providing for a reduction of 
the insurance money according to the degree of fault’ on the part of the policyholder or 
insured.66 If insurers were in fact to use this option, as might be expected, the living law 
of the PEICL would follow the principle of proportionality in a similar manner to § 81 
German ICA 2008 and Art. 14(2) of the Swiss ICA/Art. 41(2) of the Swiss Draft ICA. 
The same approach is used by the PEICL in cases of failure to avert or mitigate the loss67 
or to take precautionary measures.68
 There is, however, an alternative approach taken by the PEICL in cases of breach 
of the duty to disclose and of aggravation of loss. The insurer will only be (totally or 
partially) discharged in cases of aggravation of risk in which the policyholder is, or 
ought to be, aware of the aggravation.69 In addition, the insured event must have been 
caused by the aggravated risk.70 If these requirements are fulfilled, the discharge of the 
insurer will not depend upon the degree of fault on the part of the policyholder. Rather, 
the insurer will be entirely discharged if he would not have insured the aggravated risk 
at all.71 If, however, the insurer would have insured the aggravated risk in return for a 
higher premium or on other terms, a discharge would depend on the ratio between the 
premium paid and the premium hypothetically owed, had the aggravation been covered 
in the contract or on the other terms which would have been agreed upon.72 An analogous 
approach is used if the pre-contractual disclosure duty is breached by the policyholder.73
 Yet another approach is used in cases where the policyholder has not notified the 
insurer of the insured event74 or has not cooperated with the investigation of the insured 
event.75 In both cases, the insurer will be allowed to reduce the insurance money to the 
extent ‘that the insurer proves that it has been prejudiced’ by the delayed notification or 
breach of the duty to cooperate.76
65 Article 9:101 para. 1 PEICL.
66 Article 9:101 para. 2 PEICL.
67 Article 9:101 para. 3 PEICL.
68 Article 4:103 PEICL.
69 The first sentence of Article 4:203 para. 3 PEICL.
70 The first sentence of Article 4:203 para. 3 PEICL.
71 The first sentence of Article 4:203 para. 3 PEICL.
72 The second sentence of Article 4:203 para. 3 PEICL.
73 See Article 2:102 para. 5 PEICL.
74 Article 6:101 PEICL.
75 Article 6:102 PEICL.
76 See Article 6:101 para. 3 and Article 6:102 para. 3 (with the exception of para. 2 in cases of intent or 
recklessness).
